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Abstract—We formalize automated analysis techniques for the
validation of web services specified in BPEL and a RBAC variant
tailored to BPEL. The idea is to use decidable fragments of first-
order logic to describe the state space of a certain class of web
services and then use state-of-the-art SMT solvers to handle their
reachability problems. To assess the practical viability of our
approach, we have developed a prototype tool implementing our
techniques and applied it to a digital contract signing service
inspired by an industrial case study.
I. INTRODUCTION
Context and motivation: The design of security-sensitive
web services is an error-prone and time-consuming task. The
reasons of these difficulties are manyfold. A web service is
(often) obtained as a composition of several simpler services
executed in a distributed environment. So, because of the
huge number of possible interleavings and the subtle interplay
between the data and the control part of the processes, it is
very difficult—if not impossible—for a human to foresee all
the possible behaviors. Furthermore, the workflow of the ap-
plication is usually constrained by the enforcement of access-
control policies that forbid the execution of certain operations
or the access to shared resources by certain users and can
easily over-constrain or under-constrain the possible behaviors.
As a consequence, in the first case, correct behaviors are
prevented, thereby decreasing the overall dependability of the
service, while in the second case, incorrect behaviors are
possible that may open security breaches, thus destroying the
dependability of the service.
Hence, automated techniques for the validation of security-
sensitive web services at design time are needed to assist the
designers and avoid expensive actions for the correction of
errors after deployment. While this is only a preliminary step
in the direction of building highly dependable web services,
it constitutes a necessary stepping stone for the application of
other techniques at run-time for orchestration and coordination
of services and for enforcing access policies.
Contributions: In this paper, we formalize automated
analysis techniques for the validation of web services specified
in BPEL and a variant of RBAC tailored to BPEL as proposed
in [1]. RBAC (see, e.g., [2]) is one of the most successful
models for access control in large and complex applications.
Our idea is to translate a BPEL process to a particular class
of transition systems, described by arithmetic constraints and
called Vector Addition Systems (VASs), and to encode the
RBAC specification in a decidable class of first-order formu-
lae, called Bernays-Scho¨nfinkel-Ramsey (BSR). We study the
goal reachability problem (to which several analysis problems
can be reduced) of the resulting class of transition systems.
Theoretically, we prove the decidability of the reachability
problem for a particular class of transition systems modeling
BPEL processes where no loops occur. Pragmatically, to assess
the viability of our approach, we have developed a prototype
tool called WSSMT, which implements our techniques and
uses state-of-the-art theorem-proving techniques recently de-
veloped in the area of Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT)
and featuring a good trade-off between scalability and expres-
siveness. We report on the application of WSSMT on a digital
contract signing service inspired by an industrial case study.
Related work: While BPEL semantics is given in natural
language in [3], there have been many attempts to give a
formal semantics of the language in terms of Petri nets,
e.g., [4]. The formalization is useful in two respects: it elim-
inates possible ambiguities in the natural language semantics
and it permits the formal analysis of BPEL processes at the
design time. Although there are tools (e.g., [5]) that provide
automated support for the translation from BPEL to Petri
nets and the subsequent analysis, they (to the best of our
knowledge) only model the control flow and abstract away
from the data manipulation. Recently, there have been attempts
at extending Petri nets with some data modeling and reasoning
capabilities by using fragments of first-order logic (FOL) for
which efficient SMT solvers exist [6]. Instead of a hybrid
representation, we chose to develop our techniques in a first-
order framework by exploiting the well-known connection
between Petri nets and VASs (see, e.g., [7], [8]) and then to
extend it along the lines suggested in [9] to incorporate the
access-control layer in a uniform way. The work in [9] studies
the decidability of symbolic executions with bounded length
for more general classes of services while here we focus on a
particular class of applications whose sets of reachable states
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can be finitely described by suitable fragments of FOL. The
work in [10] is closely related to ours with respect to the
structure of the specification divided in two layers, one for
the workflow and one for access control. However, [10] does
not provide a decidability result for the reachability problem
as we do in this paper.
Organization: § II briefly introduces the languages used
to specify the class of web services we consider, i.e. BPEL and
RBAC4BPEL, together with a concrete example that we use to
illustrate the key features of the formal framework. § III recalls
the definition of two-level transition system introduced in [9],
and its related reachability problem, explains how BPEL and
RBAC4BPEL specifications can be translated to this class of
transition systems, and proves the decidability of the reach-
ability problem for two-level transition systems obtained by
translating a class of acyclic Petri nets (called workflow nets).
§ IV discusses how our techniques have been implemented and
applied to a digital contract signing service, inspired by an
industrial application. In §V, we draw conclusions and discuss
future work. Proofs of the formal results are given in an
appendix.
II. BPEL, RBAC4BPEL, AND A MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
We characterize the class of applications we are interested in
by using the Purchase Ordering (PO) process introduced in [1].
To make the paper self contained, in this section, we briefly
illustrate the example and give a high-level description of the
languages used to specify it. The PO process is composed of
six activities: the creation of a purchase order for a certain
good (crtPO), the approval of the order before dispatching the
good to the supplier (apprPO), the acknowledgement of the
delivery by signing (signGRN) and then countersigning (ctr-
signGRN) the goods-received note, the creation of a payment
file on receipt of the supplier’s invoice for the good (crtPay),
and the approval of the payment to the supplier (apprPay).
For the PO process to complete successfully, the order of
execution of the various activities should satisfy the following
constraints: crtPO must be executed before apprPO which, in
turn, must be executed before the remaining four activities;
crtPay can be done in parallel with both signGRN and ctr-
signGRN but before apprPay; and signGRN, ctrsignGRN, and
apprPay must be executed in this order. The workflow (WF)
level of the application should enforce these dependencies that
are induced by the application logic of the PO process.
A. The WF level and BPEL
In [1], the Business Process Execution Language (BPEL [3])
is used to describe a (executable) specification of the WF
level of an application. In Fig. 1, we show a high-level
BPEL specification of the WF level of the PO process. The
<process> element wraps around the entire description of
the PO process. The <sequence> element states that the
activities contained in its scope must be executed sequen-
tially. The <flow> element specifies concurrent threads of
activities. The <invoke> element represents the invocation
of an activity that is provided by an available web service.
<process name="PO"/>
<sequence>
<receive operation="crtPO" ... > </receive>
<invoke operation="apprPO" ... > </invoke>
<flow>
<sequence>
<invoke operation="signGRN" ... > </invoke>
<invoke operation="ctrsignGRN" ... > </invoke>
</sequence>
<invoke operation="ctrPay" ... > </invoke>
</flow>
<invoke operation="apprPay" ... > </invoke>
</sequence>
</process>
Fig. 1. The WF level of the PO process: BPEL.
Fig. 2. The WF level of the PO process: Petri Net corresponding to BPEL
in Fig. 1.
Finally, the <receive> element represents the invocation
of an activity that is provided by the BPEL process being
described. Indeed, BPEL provides a variety of constructs (e.g.,
to represent variables) that are ignored here for simplicity;
the interested reader is pointed to [3]. In the case of the PO
process, it is easy to see that the constraints on the execution
described above are all satisfied by the nesting of control
elements in Fig. 1. For example, because of the semantics
of <sequence>, crtPO will be executed first while apprPay
will be the activity finishing the PO process.
Fig. 2 shows a Petri net that can be seen as the (formal)
U := {u1, u2, u3, u4, u5} R := {Manager, F inAdmin, F inClerk, POAdmin, POClerk}
P := {p1, ..., p5} ua := {(u1,Manager), (u2, F inAdmin), (u3, F inClerk), (u4, POAdmin), (u5, POClerk)}
pa := {(FinClerk, p4), (FinAdmin, p5), (POClerk, p3), (POAdmin, p1)}
 least partial order s.t. Manager  FinAdmin, Manager  POAdmin,
F inAdmin  FinClerk, and POAdmin  POClerk.
Fig. 3. The PM level of the PO process: RBAC
semantics of the BPEL process in Fig. 1. Before being able
to sketch the mapping from BPEL processes to Petri nets, we
recall the basic notions concerning the latter.
A Petri net is a triple 〈P, T, F 〉, where P is a finite set of
places, T is a finite set of transitions, and F (flow relation) is
a set of arcs such that P ∩T = ∅ and F ⊆ (P ×T )∪(T ×P ).
Graphically, the Petri net 〈P, T, F 〉 can be depicted as a
directed bipartite graph with two types of nodes, places and
transitions, represented by circles and rectangles, respectively;
the nodes are connected via directed arcs according to F
(where arcs between two nodes of the same type are not
allowed). A place p is called an input (resp., output) place
of a transition t iff there exists a directed arc from p to t
(resp., from t to p). The set of input (resp., output) places of a
transition t is denoted by •t (resp., t•); •p and p• are defined
similarly. A path in a Petri net 〈P, T, F 〉 is a finite sequence
e0, ..., en of elements from P ∪ T such that ei+1 ∈ ei• for
each i = 0, ..., n− 1; a path e0, ..., en in the net is a cycle if
no element occurs more than once in it and e0 ∈ en• for some
n ≥ 1. A Petri net is acyclic if none of its paths is a cycle.
A marking of a Petri net 〈P, T, F 〉 is a mapping from the set
P of places to the set of non-negative integers; graphically,
it is depicted as a distribution of black dots in the circles of
the graph representing the net. A transition t is enabled in a
marking m iff each of its input places p is such that m(p) ≥ 1,
i.e., p contains at least one token. An enabled transition t in
a marking m may fire by generating a new marking m′, in
symbols m t→ m′, where m′(p) = m(p) if p 6∈ (•t ∪ t•),
m′(p) = m(p)−1 if p ∈ •t, and m′(p) = m(p) + 1 if p ∈ t•,
i.e. t consumes one token from each input place of t and
produces one token in each of its output places. A marking m
is reachable from m0, in symbols m0 →∗ m, iff there exists
a sequence m1, ...,mn of markings such that mi
t→ mi+1 for
i = 0, ..., n − 1 and mn = m, for some n ≥ 0. (In case
n = 0, we have that m0 = m.) Given a Petri net 〈P, T, F 〉
and a marking m, an instance of the reachable problem for
Petri nets consists of checking whether m0 →∗ m or not. A
workflow (WF) net [11] is a Petri net 〈P, T, F 〉 such that (a)
there exist two special places i, o ∈ P with •i = ∅ and o• = ∅;
and (b) for each transition t ∈ T , there exists a path pi in the
net beginning with i and ending with o in which t occurs.
The idea underlying the Petri net semantics of BPEL is
simple. Activities are mapped to transitions (the rectangles
in Fig. 2) and their execution is modeled by the flow of
tokens from input places to output places. When two BPEL
operations are enclosed in a <sequence> element (e.g.,
crtPO and apprPO), two transitions are created (as in Fig. 2)
with one input place (resp., p1 and p2) and one output place
each (resp., p2 and p3), and the input place of the second is
identified with the output place of the first one (p2). When two
BPEL operations are in a <flow> element (e.g., ctrPay and
the sequence of operations signGRN and ctrsignGRN), four
transitions are created: one to represent the split of the flow,
one to represent its synchronization (join), and one for each
activity that can be executed concurrently with the appropriate
places to connect them (in Fig. 2, when a token is in place
p3, the ‘flow split’ transition is enabled and its execution
yields one token in place p4 and one in p5, which enables
both transitions signGRN and ctrPay that can be executed
concurrently; the two independent threads of activities get
synchronized again by the execution of ‘flow join’, which is
enabled when a token is in p6 and a token is in p8). It is easy
to see that the Petri net of Fig. 2 is an acyclic WF net where
p1 is the special input place i, p10 is the special output place
o, and each transition occurs in a path from p1 to p10.
B. The policy management (PM) level and RBAC4BPEL
Besides the dependencies imposed by the WF level, con-
straints on the execution of the activities derived from security
requirements are of crucial importance to ensure the depend-
ability of the application. In this paper, we focus on a particular
class of security requirements that pertain to the access-control
policy. The policy management (PM) level of the application
is charged to enforce these constraints.
In [1], an extension of the Role Based Access Control
(RBAC) framework—adapted to work smoothly with BPEL,
denoted with RBAC4BPEL—is used to specify the PM level
of applications. The components of RBAC4BPEL are: (i) a set
U of users, (ii) a set R of roles, (iii) a set P of permissions,
(iv) a role hierarchy  (i.e. a partial-order relation on R),
(v) a user-role assignment relation ua, (vi) a role-permission
assignment relation pa, and (vii) a set A of activities and
a class of authorization constraints (such as separation-of-
duty) to prevent some user to acquire permissions in certain
executions of the application (see below for details). Note that
components (i)–(vi) are standard in RBAC while (vii) has been
added to obtain a better integration between the PM and the
WF levels.
First, we describe components (i)–(vi) and some related
notions. A user u ∈ U is assigned a role r ∈ R if (u, r) ∈ ua
and permissions are associated with roles when (p, r) ∈ pa. In
RBAC4BPEL, a user u ∈ U has a permission p if there exists
a role r ∈ R such that (u, r) ∈ ua and (p, r) ∈ pa. (We will
see that each permission is associated to a right on a certain
activity in A—e.g., its execution—of a BPEL process.) The
role hierarchy⊆ R×R is assumed to be a partial order (i.e., a
reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive relation) reflecting the
rights associated to roles. More precisely, a user u is an explicit
member of role r ∈ R if (u, r) ∈ ua and it is an implicit
member of role r ∈ R if there exists a role r′ ∈ R such that
(r′, r) ∈ (abbreviated as r′  r), r′ 6= r, and (u, r′) ∈ ua.
Thus,  induces a permission inheritance relation as follows:
a user u ∈ U can get permission p if there exists a role r ∈ R
such that u is a member (either implicit or explicit) of r and
(p, r) ∈ pa. For simplicity, we abstract away the definition of
a role in terms of a set of attributes as done in [1].
Fig. 3 shows the sets U,R, P and the relations , ua, pa for
the PM level of the PO process. Although (Manager, pi) 6∈
pa for any i = 1, ..., 5, we have that user u1, which is explicitly
assigned to role Manager in ua, can get any permission pi for
i = 2, ..., 5 as Manager  r for any role r ∈ R\{Manager},
hence u1 can be implicitly assigned to each role and then get
the permission pi.
In RBAC4BPEL, each permission in P is associated with
the right to handle a certain transition of T , uniquely identified
by a label in A, for a Petri net 〈P, T, F 〉. For the PO process,
this is particularly simple since only the right to execute a
transition is considered. So, p1 is the permission for executing
apprPO, p2 for signGNR, p3 for ctrSignGNR, p4 for crtPay,
and p5 for apprPay. We are now in the position to describe
component (vii) of RBAC4BPEL. Note that there are no
permissions associated to ‘flow split’ and ‘flow join’ as these
are performed by the BPEL engine and thus no particular
authorization restriction must be enforced.
A role (resp., user) authorization constraint is a tuple
〈D, (t1, t2), ρ〉 if D ⊆ R (resp., D ⊆ U ) is the domain of
the constraint, ρ ⊆ R × R (resp., ρ ⊆ U × U ), and t1, t2 are
in A. An authorization constraint 〈D, (t1, t2), ρ〉 is satisfied if
(x, y) ∈ ρ when x, y ∈ D, x performs t1, and y performs t2. In
other words, authorization constraints place further restrictions
(besides those of the standard RBAC components) on the
roles or users who can perform certain actions once others
have been already executed by users belonging to certain
roles. Constraints of this kind allow one to specify separation-
of-duty (SoD) by 〈D, (t1, t2), 6=〉, binding-of-duty (BoD) by
〈D, (t1, t2),=〉, or any other restrictions that can be specified
by a binary relation over roles or users.
For the PO process, (vii) of RBAC4BPEL is instantiated as:
〈U, (apprPO, signGNR), 6=〉, 〈U, (apprPO, crtSignGNR), 6=〉,
〈U, (signGNR, crtSignGNR), 6=〉, 〈R, (crtPay, apprPay),≺〉,
where ≺:= {(r1, r2) | r1, r2 ∈ R, r2  r1, r1 6= r2} (recall
that the sets U and R are defined in Fig. 3).
This concludes the description of the class of applications
that we consider. We now proceed to introduce our techniques
to analyze such applications.
III. FORMALIZATION AND AUTOMATED ANALYSIS
From now on, we assume that the WF level of an application
is specified by a Petri net and the PM level by an instance
of the RBAC4BPEL framework. We use two-level transition
systems [9] to represent the WF level and the PM level of
a web-service and we study the reachability problem for a
sub-class.
A. Two-level transition systems and goal reachability
We assume the basic notions of FOL (see, e.g., [12]). A
two-level transition system Tr is a tuple
〈x, p, In(x, p), {τi(x, p, x′, p′) | i = 1, ..., n}〉,
where x is a tuple of WF state variables, p is a tuple of
PM state variables, the initial condition In(x, p) is a FOL
formula whose only free variables are in x and where PM state
variables in p may occur as predicate symbols, the transition
τi(x, p, x
′, p′) is a FOL formula whose only free variables
are in x, x′ and where PM state variables in p, p′ may occur
as predicate symbols (as it is customary, unprimed variables
in τi refer to the values of the state before the execution of
the transition while those primed to the values of the state
afterward) for i = 1, ..., n and n ≥ 1.
We assume there exists a so-called first-order underlying
structure 〈D, I〉 of the transition system Tr, where D is the
domain of values and I is the mapping from the signature to
functions and relations over D, and in which the state variables
and the symbols of the signature used to write the formulae In
and τi for i = 1, ..., n are mapped. A state of Tr is a pair v :=
(vx, vp) of mappings: vx from the WF state variables to D and
vp from the PM state variables to relations over D. A run of Tr
is a (possibly infinite) sequence of states v0, v1, ..., vn, ... such
that (a) v0 satisfies In, in symbols v0 |= In, and (b) for every
pair vi, vi+1 in the sequence, there exists j ∈ {1, ..., n} such
that vi, vi+1 satisfies τj , in symbols vi, vi+1 |= τj , where the
domain of vi is x, p and that of vi+1 is x′, p′. Given a formula
G(x, p), called the goal, an instance of the goal reachability
problem for Tr consists of answering the following question:
does there exist a natural number ` ≥ 0 such that the formula
In(x0, p0) ∧
`−1∧
i=o
τ(xi, pi, xi+1, pi+1) ∧G(x`, p`) (1)
is satisfiable in the underlying structure of Tr, where xi, pi
are renamed copies of the state variables in x, p? (When ` =
0, (1) is simply In(x0, p0) ∧ G(x0, p0).) The interest of the
goal reachability problem lies in the fact that many verification
problems for two-level transition systems, such as deadlock
freedom and invariant checking, can be reduced to it.
B. Forward reachability and symbolic execution tree
If we were able to check automatically the satisfiability of
(1), an idea to solve the goal reachability problem for two-
level transition systems would be to generate instances of (1)
for increasing values of `. However, this would only give us a
semi-decision procedure for the reachability problem. In fact,
this method terminates only when the goal is reachable from
the initial state, i.e. when the instance of (1) for a certain
value of ` is unsatisfiable in the underlying structure of the
transition system Tr. But, when the goal is not reachable,
the check will never detect the unsatisfiability and we will
be bound to generating an infinite sequence of instances of
(1) for increasing values of `. That is, the decidability of the
satisfiability of (1) in the underlying structure of Tr is only a
necessary condition for ensuring the decidability of the goal
reachability problem.
We can formalize this method as follows. The post-image
of a formula K(x, p) with respect to a transition τi is
Post(K, τi) := ∃x′, p′.(K(x′, p′) ∧ τi(x′, p′, x, p)).
For the class of transition systems that we consider below,
we are always able to find FOL formulae that are equivalent
to Post(K, τi). Thus, the use of the second-order quanti-
fier over the predicate symbols in p′ should not worry the
reader (see § III-D for details). Now, define the following
sequence of formulae by recursion: FR0(K, τ) := K and
FRi+1(K, τ) := Posti(FRi, τ) ∨ FRi(K, τ), for i ≥ 0
and τ :=
∨n
k=1 τi. The formula FR
`(K, In) describes the
set of states of the transition system Tr that are forward
reachable in ` ≥ 0 steps. A fix-point is the least value of `
such that FR`+1(τ, In)⇒ FR`(τ, In) is true in the structure
underlying Tr. Note also that FR`(τ, In) ⇒ FR`+1(τ, In)
by construction and hence if FR`+1(τ, In) ⇒ FR`(τ, In)
is valid, then also FR`(τ, In) ⇔ FR`+1(τ, In) is so and
FR`(τ, In) ⇔ FR`′(τ, In) for each `′ ≥ `. Using the
sequence of formulae FR0(τ, In), FR1(τ, In), ... it is pos-
sible to check if the goal property G will be reached by
checking whether FR`(τ, In)∧G is satisfiable in the structure
underlying Tr for some ` ≥ 0. In case of satisfiability,
we say that G is reachable. Otherwise, if FR`(τ, In) is a
fix-point, the unsatisfiability of FR`(τ, In) ∧ G implies that
G is unreachable. Finally, if FR`(τ, In) is not a fix-point
and FR`(τ, In) ∧ G is unsatisfiable, then we must increase
the value of ` by 1 so as to compute the set of forward
reachable states in ` + 1 steps and perform the reachability
checks again. Unfortunately, also this process is not guaran-
teed to terminate for arbitrary two-level transition systems.
Fortunately, we are able to characterize a set of transition
systems, corresponding to a relevant class of applications
specified in BPEL and RBAC4BPEL, for which we can pre-
compute an upper bound on `; this paves the way to solving
automatically the goal reachability problem for these systems.
To this end, we consider three sufficient conditions to automate
the solution of the goal reachability problem. First, the class
C of formulae used to describe sets of states must be closed
under post-image computation. Second, the satisfiability (in
the structure underlying the transition system) of C must be
decidable. Third, it must be possible to pre-compute a bound
on the length of the sequence FR0, FR1, ..., FR` of formulae.
Below, we show that these conditions are satisfied by a class
of two-level transition systems to which applications specified
in BPEL and RBAC4BPEL can be mapped. For ease of
exposition, we first consider the WF and PM levels in isolation
and then show how the results for each level can be modularly
lifted when considering the two levels together. Before doing
this, we introduce the notion of ‘symbolic execution tree.’ The
purpose of this is two-fold. First, it is crucial for the technical
development of our decidability result. Second, it is the starting
point for the implementation of our techniques as discussed
in § IV.
The symbolic execution tree of the two-level transition
system Tr is a labeled tree defined as follows: (i) the root
node is labeled by the formula In, (ii) a node n labeled
by the formula K has d ≤ n sons n1, ..., nd labeled by the
formulae Post(τ1,K), ..., Post(τd,K) such that Post(τj ,K)
is satisfiable in the model underlying Tr and the edge from
n to nj is labeled by τj for j = 1, ..., d, (iii) a node n
labeled by K has no son, in which case n is a final node,
if Post(τj ,K) is unsatisfiable in the underlying model of
the VAS, for each j = 1, ..., n. A symbolic execution tree
is 0-complete if it consists of the root node labeled by the
formula In, it is (d + 1)-complete for d ≥ 0 if its depth is
d+ 1 and for each node n labeled by a formula Kn at depth
d, if Post(τj ,Kn) is satisfiable, then there exists a node n′
at depth d + 1 labeled by Post(τj ,Kn). In other words, a
symbolic execution tree is d-complete when all non-empty sets
of forward states reachable in one step represented by formulae
labeling nodes at depth d−1 have been generated. It is easy to
see that the formula FR`(K, In), describing the set of states
of the transition system Tr forward reachable in ` ≥ 0 steps,
is equivalent to the disjunction of the formulae labeling the
nodes of an `-complete symbolic execution tree. This will be
proved for the classes of two-level transition systems that we
consider below.
C. WF nets and terminating forward reachability
We consider a particular class of two-level tran-
sition systems, called Vector Addition System (VAS),
〈x, In(x), {τi(x, x′) | i = 1, ..., n}〉, such that (a) p = ∅;
(b) their underlying structure is that of integers; (c) each WF
state variable in x = x1, ..., xm ranges over the set of non-
negative integers; (d) the initial condition In(x) is a formula
of the form xi ./ c1 ∧ · · · ∧ xm ./ cm, where cj is a natural
number for j = 1, ...,m and ./∈ {=, 6=, >,≥}; and (e) each
transition τi, for i = 1, ..., n, is a formula of the form∧
i∈P
xi ≥ 0 ∧
∧
j∈U+
x′j = xj + 1 ∧
∧
k∈U−
x′k = xk − 1 ∧
∧
l∈U=
x′l = xl,
where P,U+, U−, U= are subsets of {1, ..., n} such that
U+, U−, U= form a partition of {1, ..., n}.
It is well-known that Petri nets and VASs are equivalent
in the sense that analysis problems for the former can be
transformed to problems of the latter whose solutions can be
mapped back to solutions for the original problem and vice
versa (see, e.g., [8]). We briefly describe the correspondence
by considering the Petri net in Fig. 2. We associate an integer
variable xi to each place pi for i = 1, ..., 10 whose value will
be the number of tokens in the place. The state is given by the
value of the integer variables that represents the marking of
the net, i.e. a mapping from the set of places to non-negative
integers. Formulae can be used to represent sets of states
(or, equivalently, of markings). So, for example, the formula
x1 = 1∧
∧10
i=2 xi = 0 represents the marking where one token
is in place p1 and all the other places are empty (which is the
one depicted in Fig. 2 where the token is represented by a
solid circle inside that represents the place p1 while all the
other places do not contain any solid circle). The transition
crtPO is represented by the formula
x1 ≥ 1 ∧ x′1 = x1 − 1 ∧ x′2 = x2 + 1 ∧
10∧
i=3
xi = xi
saying that it is enabled when there is at least one token in
p1 (x1 ≥ 1) and the result of its execution is that a token is
consumed at place p1 (x′1 = x1 − 1), the tokens in p2 are
incremented by one (x′2 = x2 + 1), while the tokens in all
the other places are unaffected (x′i = xi for i = 3, ..., 10).
The other transitions of the Petri net in Fig. 2 are translated
in a similar way. In general, it is always possible to associate
a state of a VAS to a marking of a Petri net and vice versa.
This implies that solving the reachability problem for a VAS is
equivalent to solving the reachability problem of the associated
Petri net.
Now, we show that the three sufficient conditions (see
§ III-B) to mechanize the solution of the goal reachability
problem are satisfied by VASs when using forward reacha-
bility. First, the class of formulae is closed under post-image
computation.
Fact 1: Post(K, τi) is equivalent to K[xj +1, xk−1, xl]∧∧
i∈P xi ≥ 0, where K[xj +1, xk−1, xl] denotes the formula
obtained by replacing x′j with xj − 1 for j ∈ U+, x′k with
xk − 1 for k ∈ U−, and x′l with xl + 1 for j ∈ U=. 
As a corollary, it is immediate to derive that if K is a
formula of Linear Arithmetic (LA) [13]—roughly, a formula
where multiplication between variables is forbidden—then
also Post(K, τi) is equivalent to an effectively computable
formula of LA. Second, the satisfiability of the class of
formulae of LA is decidable by well-known results [13]. Third,
it is possible to pre-compute a bound on the length of the
sequence FR0, FR1, ..., FR` of formulae. Using the notion
of symbolic execution tree introduced above, once specialized
to VASs, we can then prove:
Lemma 1: Let PN := 〈P, T, F 〉 be an acyclic workflow net
and Π be the set of all its paths. Then, the set of forward reach-
able states of the VAS 〈x, In(x), {τi(x, x′) | i = 1, ..., n}〉
associated to PN is identified by the formula FR`(τ, In) for
` = maxpi∈Π{len(pi|T )}, where pi|T is the sequence obtained
from pi by forgetting each of its elements in P and len(pi|T )
is the length of the sequence pi|T . 
D. RBAC4BPEL and terminating forward reachability
Preliminarily, let Enum({v1, ..., vn}, S) be the following
set of FOL formulae axiomatizing the enumerated datatype
with values v1, ..., vn for a given n ≥ 1 over a type S:
vi 6= vj for each pair (i, j) of numbers in {1, ..., n} such
that i 6= j and ∀x. (x = v1 ∨ · · · ∨ x = vn), where x is a
variable of type S. The formulae in Enum({v1, ..., vn}, S) fix
the number of elements of any interpretation to be v1, ..., vn;
it is easy to see that the class of structures satisfying these
formulae are closed under isomorphism. We consider a partic-
ular class of two-level transition systems, called RBAC4BPEL,
〈p, In(p), {τi(p, p′) | i = 1, ..., n}〉 such that (a) x = ∅; (b)
the initial condition In(p) is of the form ∀w.ϕ(w), where ϕ
is a quantifier-free formula where at most the variables in w
may occur free; and (c) the underlying structure is one in the
(isomorphic) class of many-sorted structures axiomatized by
the following sentences:
Enum(U,User), Enum(R,Role),
Enum(P,Permission), Enum(A,Action),
∀u, r.(ua(u, r)⇔
∨
cU∈Uua,cr∈Rua
(u = cu ∧ r = cr))
∀r, p.(pa(r, p)⇔
∨
cr∈Rpa,cp∈Ppa
(r = cr ∧ p = cp))
cr  c′r for cr, c′r ∈ R
∀r.(r  r) ∀r1, r2, r3.(r1  r2 ∧ r2  r3 ⇒ r1  r3)
∀r1, r2.(r1  r2 ∧ r2  r1 ⇒ r1 = r2),
where U , R and P are finite sets of constants denoting users,
roles, and permissions, respectively, A is a finite set of actions,
u is a variable of type User , r and its subscripted versions
are variables of type Role , p is a variable of type Permission ,
Uua ⊆ U , Rua ⊆ R, Rpa ⊆ R, and Ppa ⊆ P ; (d) p = xcd
is a predicate symbol of type User × Action abbreviating
executed ; and (e) each τi is of the form
∃u. (ξ(u, xcd) ∧ ∀x, y.(xcd ′(x, y)⇔ ((x = uj ∧ y = p) ∨ xcd(x, y)))),
where u is a tuple of existentially quantified variables of
type User , uj is the variable at position j in u, and ξ(u)
is a quantifier-free formula (called the guard of the transition)
where no function symbol of arity greater than 0 may occur
(the part of τi specifying xcd ′ is called the update).
We now explain how an RBAC4BPEL system can
be specified by the formulae above on the example
described in § II. To constrain the sets of users, of
roles, and permissions to contain exactly the elements
specified in Fig. 3, it is sufficient to use the following
sets of formulae: Enum({u1, u2, u3, u4},User),
Enum({Manager, F inAdmin, F inClerk, POAdmin, PO-
Clerk}, Role), and Enum({p1, p2, p3, p4, p5},Permission).
It is also easy to see that the formulae
∀u, r.(ua(u, r)⇔

(u = u1 ∧ r =Manager)∨
(u = u2 ∧ r = FinAdmin)∨
(u = u3 ∧ r = FinClerk)∨
(u = u4 ∧ r = POAdmin)∨
(u = u5 ∧ r = POClerk)

∀r, p.(pa(r, p)⇔
 (r = FinClerk ∧ p = p4)∨(r = FinAdmin ∧ p = p5)∨(r = POClerk ∧ p = p3)∨
(r = POAdmin ∧ p = p1)

are satisfied by the interpretations of ua and pa in Fig. 3
and that Manager  FinAdmin, Manager  POAdmin,
FinAdmin  FinClerk, and POAdmin  POClerk
with the three formulae above for reflexivity, transitivity and
antisymmetry make the interpretation of  the partial order
considered in Fig. 3. The state variable xcd allows us to
formalize component (vii) of the RBAC4BPEL system about
the authorization constraints. The idea is to use xcd to store
the pair user u and action a when u has performed a so that
the authorization constraints can be formally expressed by a
transition involving suitable pre-conditions on these variables.
We illustrate the details on the first authorization constraint
considered in § II-B, i.e. 〈U, (apprPO, signGNR), 6=〉. The
corresponding transition can be formalized as follows:
∃x1, x2.(xcd(x1, apprPO) ∧ x1 6= x2 ∧
∀x, y.(xcd ′(x, y)⇔ ((x = x2 ∧ y = signGNR) ∨ xcd(x, y))).
The guard of the transition prescribes that the user x2
is not the same user x1 that has previously performed
the action apprPO and the update stores in xcd the new
pair (x2, signGNR). The following two constraints at
the end of § II-B, namely 〈U, (apprPO, ctrSignGNR), 6=〉
and 〈U, (signGNR, ctrSignGNR), 6=〉, are formalized in
a similar way. The encoding of the last constraint, i.e.
〈R, (ctrPay, apprPay),≺〉, is more complex and requires
also the use of the user-role relation ua to represent the
constraint on the role hierarchy:
∃x1, x2, r1, r2.(xcd(x1, crtPay) ∧ ua(x1, r1) ∧
ua(x2, r2) ∧ r2  r1 ∧ r1 6= r2 ∧
∀x, y.(xcd ′(x, y)⇔ ((x = x2 ∧ y = apprPay) ∨ xcd(x, y))).
The reader should now be convinced that every RBAC4BPEL
specification can be translated into a RBAC4BPEL system.
Now, we show that the three sufficient conditions to mecha-
nize the solution of the goal reachability problem (see § III-B)
are satisfied by RBAC4BPEL systems when using forward
reachability. First, the class of formulae is closed under post-
image computation.
Fact 2: Post(K, τi) is equivalent to
(∃u.(K(xcd) ∧ xcd(uj , t) ∧ ξ(u, xcd))) ∨
(∃u.(K[λx, y.(¬(x = uj ∧ y = t) ∧ xcd(x, y))] ∧
ξ[u, λx, y.(¬(x = uj ∧ y = t) ∧ xcd(x, y))])) ,
where K[λx, y.(¬(x = uj∧y = t)∧xcd(x, y))] is the formula
obtained from K by substituting each occurrence of xcd′ with
the λ-expression in the square brackets and then performing
the β-reduction and similarly for ξ[u, λx, y.(¬(x = uj ∧ y =
t) ∧ xcd(x, y))]. 
As anticipated above when introducing the definition of
post-image for two-level transition systems, we can eliminate
the second-order quantifier over the predicate symbol xcd .
Now, recall that a formula is in the Bernays-Scho¨nfinkel-
Ramsey (BSR) class if it has the form ∃z∀w. φ(z, w), for φ
a quantifier-free formula and z ∩ w = ∅ (see, e.g., [14]).
As a corollary of Fact 2, it is immediate to see that if K
is a BSR formula, then also Post(τi,K) is equivalent—
by trivial logical manipulations—to a formula in the BSR
class. Since In(xcd) is a formula in the BSR class, then
all the formulae in the sequence FR0, FR1, ... will also
be BSR formulae. The second requirement is also fulfilled
since the satisfiability of the BSR class is well-known to
be decidable [14] and the formulae used to axiomatize the
structures underlying the RBAC4BPEL transition systems are
also in BSR. Third, it is possible to pre-compute a bound on
the length of the sequence FR0, FR1, ..., FR` of formulae,
although the existential prefix grows after each computation of
the post-image when considering the formulae describing the
set of forward reachable states. This is so because we consider
only a finite and known set of users so that the length of the
existentially quantified prefix is bounded by nku×n, where k is
the maximal length of the existential prefixes of the transitions
in the RBAC4BPEL system, nu is the number of users, and
n is the number of transitions.
Property 1: Let 〈p, In(p), {τi(p, p′) | i = 1, ..., n}〉 be a
RBAC4BPEL system, k the maximal length of the existential
prefixes of τ1, ..., τn, and nu be the cardinality of the set of
users. Then, its symbolic execution tree is `-complete for every
` ≥ nku × n. 
The key idea of the proof is the observation that xcd is
interpreted as a subset of the Cartesian product between the set
of users and the set of actions whose cardinalities are bounded.
E. Combining VASs and RBAC4BPEL systems
We are now ready to fully specify applications that feature
both the WF and the PM level. To do this, we consider two-
level transition systems, called VAS+RBAC4BPEL systems, of
the form
〈x, p, InV (x) ∧ InR(p), {τVi (x, x′) ∧ τRi (p, p′) | i = 1, ..., n}〉,
where x = x1, ..., xn for some n ≥ 1, p = xcd , InV (x) is
the initial condition of a VAS, InR(p) is the initial condition
of a RBAC4BPEL system, τVi (x, x
′) is a transition of a
VAS, τRi (p, p
′) is a transition formula of a RBAC4BPEL
system for i = 1, ..., n. Note that for some transition, the
guard ξ of τRi (p, p
′) may be tautological since the operation
involves no access-control policy restriction (e.g., the ‘flow
split’ and ‘flow join’ of the Petri net in Fig. 2). It is nat-
ural to associate a VAS and an RBAC4BPEL system to a
VAS+RBAC4BPEL system by projection, i.e. the associated
VAS is 〈x, InV (x), {τVi (x, x′) | i = 1, ..., n}〉 and the asso-
ciated RBAC4BPEL system is 〈p, InR(p), {τRi (p, p′) | i =
1, ..., n}〉. The structure underlying the VAS+RBAC4BPEL
system is such that its reduct to the signature of the VAS
is identical to the structure underlying the associated VAS and
its reduct to the signature of the RBAC4BPEL system is iden-
tical to the structure underlying the associated RBAC4BPEL
system.
We now show how it is possible to modularly compute the
post-image of a VAS+RBAC4BPEL system by combining the
post-images of the associated VAS and RBAC4BPEL system.
Fact 3: Let K(x, xcd) := KV (x) ∧ KR(xcd). Then,
Post(K, τi) is equivalent to
KV [xj + 1, xk − 1, xl] ∧
∧
i∈P
xi ≥ 0 ∧
((∃u.(KR(xcd) ∧ xcd(uj , t) ∧ ξ(u, xcd))) ∨
(∃u.(KR[λx, y.(¬(x = uj ∧ y = t) ∧ xcd(x, y))] ∧
ξ[u, λx, y.(¬(x = uj ∧ y = t) ∧ xcd(x, y))]))) ,
where the same notational conventions of Facts 1 and 2
have been adopted. In other words, the post-image of
a VAS+RBAC4BPEL system is obtained as the conjunc-
tion of the post-images of the associated VAS, denoted
with PostV (K, τi) := Post(KV , τVi ), and the associ-
ated RBAC4BPEL system, denoted with PostR(K, τi) :=
Post(KR, τ
R
i ). Thus, we abbreviate the above formula as
PostV (K, τi) ∧ PostR(K, τi). 
The proof of this fact is obtained by simple manipulations
minimizing the scope of applicability of ∃x and ∃xcd , re-
spectively, and then realizing that the proofs of Facts 1 and 2
can be re-used verbatim. Because of the modularity of post-
image computation, it is possible to modularly define the
set of forward reachable states and the symbolic execution
trees for VAS+RBAC4BPEL systems in the obvious way. By
modularity, we can easily show the following property.
Property 2: Let PN := 〈P, T, F 〉 be a an acyclic WF
net, 〈x, InV (x), {τVi (x, x′) | i = 1, ..., n}〉 be its associated
VAS, and 〈p, InR(p), {τRi (p, p′) | i = 1, ..., n}〉 be the
RBAC4BPEL system with nu users and k be the maxi-
mal length of the existential prefixes of τR1 , ..., τ
R
n . Then,
the symbolic reachability tree of the VAS+RBAC4BPEL
system whose associated VAS and RBAC system are
those specified above is `-complete for every ` ≥
min(maxpi∈Π{len(pi|T )}, nku × |T |). 
The key observation in the proof of this property is that in
order to take a transition, the preconditions of the associated
VAS and of the associated RBAC4BPEL system must be
satisfied. Because of the modularity of the post-image, the
duality between the set of forward reachable states and the
formulae labeling the symbolic execution tree can be lifted to
VAS+RBAC4BPEL. We are now ready to state and prove the
main result of this paper.
Theorem 1: Let PN := 〈P, T, F 〉 be a an acyclic WF net
and let 〈x, InV (x), {τVi (x, x′) | i = 1, ..., n}〉 be its associated
VAS. Further, let 〈p, InR(p), {τRi (p, p′) | i = 1, ..., n}〉 be an
RBAC4BPEL system with a bounded number of users. Then,
the symbolic reachability problem of the VAS+RBAC4BPEL
system (whose associated VAS and RBAC4BPEL system are
those specified above) is decidable. 
To mechanize this result, we can use off-the-shelf a state-of-
the-art Satisfiability Modulo Theories solver such as Z3 [15]
that are capable of automatically discharging the proof obliga-
tion generated by the iterated computation of the post-image
in the structures underlying the VAS+RBAC4BPEL system.
To illustrate the kind of formulae arising in the application
of Theorem 1, we consider the example specified in Fig. 2. In
this case, we can restrict to consider three paths (projected
over the transitions) in the WF net: crtPO, apprPO, ‘flow
split’, signGRN, ctrSignGNR, crtPay, ‘flow join’, apprPay;
crtPO, apprPO, ‘flow split’, signGRN, crtPay, crtSignGRN,
‘flow join’, apprPay; and crtPO, apprPO, ‘flow split’, crtPay,
signGRN, ctrsignGRN, ‘flow join’, apprPay; each one of
length eight. It is easy to see that only the first path is to be
considered as the other two produce states that are equivalent
since it does not matter at what time crtPay is executed
with respect to signGRN and ctrSignGNR (it is possible to
mechanize also this check but we leave out the details for
lack of space). So, for example, it is possible to check the
so-called soundness of workflows [16], i.e. to check whether
it is possible to terminate without “garbage” left. In terms
of a WF net, this means that no tokens are left in places
other than the special final place o of the net. This can be
checked by computing the post-images of the initial state of the
VAS+RBAC4BPEL system of our motivating example along
the lines of Facts 1, 2, and 3 and put this in conjunction with
the formula characterizing the “no-garbage” condition, i.e.
x10 ≥ 1 ∧
9∧
i=1
xi = 0.
The resulting proof obligation, because of the closure under
post-image computation of the VAS and the RBAC4BPEL sys-
tem as well as the modularity of the post-image computation
for the VAS+RBAC4BPEL system, is decidable as it can be
put in the form ϕV ∧ϕR where ϕV is a formula of LA (whose
satisfiability is decidable) and ϕR is a BSR formula (whose
satisfiability is again decidable), and thus the satisfiability of
their conjunction is also decidable.
IV. ANALYSIS OF AN INDUSTRIAL CASE STUDY
We have implemented a prototype tool, called WSSMT, that
allows the user to explore the symbolic execution tree of a
VAS+RBAC4BPEL system. WSSMT features a client-server
architecture where the server is the Z3 SMT solver while the
client (implemented in Java as an Eclipse plug-in) takes a two-
level transition system and generates the proof obligations for
solving the reachability problem as discussed in Theorem 1.
We have first applied WSSMT on the example described
in § II to validate our ideas and then we have considered
a more significant example, inspired by an industrial case
study, i.e. the Digital Contract Signing (DCS, for short). The
scenario consists of two signers having secure access to a
trusted third party, called a Business Portal (BP), in order
to digitally sign a contract. To achieve this goal, each signer
sets the contract’s conditions by communicating them to BP,
which creates a digital version of the contract, stores it, and
coordinates the two signers in order to obtain their signatures.
The DCS process is successful when both signers provide
genuine signatures for the digital contract and the BP can
permanently store the signed copy of the contract.
The WF level specification of the DCS consists of four
BPEL processes: one for the BP, one for the two instances of
the signers, one for the service checking the signature, and one
for the service archiving the contract. To create the composed
BPEL process out of the four components, we have used the
BPEL2oWFN tool [5] that is also capable of generating a Petri
net representation of the resulting process. We have modified
the tool in order to generate the associated VAS as described
in § III-C. As a result, we have obtained a VAS with 50 integer
variables and 26 transitions.
The PM level specification of the DCS has been manually
specified as there seem to be no available tool for mechanizing
this task. More precisely, we have specified an RBAC4BPEL
system along the lines of § III-D. The set U of users is
composed of five users: two signers, the BP, one checking
the signature, and one archiving the contract; the set R of
roles contains four roles corresponding to each BPEL process;
the set P of permissions lists 24 elements corresponding to
the right of executing the 26 transitions (2 transitions do not
need authorization constraints because they are ‘flow split’ and
‘flow join’ as in the Petri net in Fig. 2 and are thus used only
for synchronization at the WF level); the relation ua prescribes
the obvious associations between users and roles (e.g., the two
users willing to sign the contract belong to the role of signers);
and the relation pa also associates the 24 permissions to the 24
transitions that need authorization constraints. Finally, we have
added SoD (e.g., the user signing the contract should not be the
same as the one checking the validity of the signature on the
contract) and BoD (e.g., the users signing the contract should
be same that have agreed on the conditions of the contract)
authorization constraints.
The property that we would like to check for the DCS
is that once a signed contract has been permanently stored,
its signatures have been checked valid and belong to the
users who provided the conditions in the contract. Indeed,
to be formalized and then verified, this property requires the
specification of the manipulation on the data (mainly, the
contract) exchanged by the various BPEL processes. As we
already observed, this is difficult if not impossible for tools
like BPEL2oWFN as they consider only the control flow. One
of the main advantages of using (fragments of) FOL as done
in this paper is the flexibility of adding features to an available
specification so as to refine it and to allow for the verification
of more complex properties such as the one mentioned above.
As a consequence, we have manually added to the avail-
able specification of the DCS a description of the messages
exchanged among the various processes and how they are
generated or modified by using well-known techniques for
the specification of message-passing systems in FOL (see,
e.g., [17]). For example, we were able to characterize the
BPEL notion of ‘correlation set’, i.e. messages passed around
contain key fields (e.g., user IDs or any business-application-
specific identifiers) that can be correlated for the lifetime of the
exchange and, e.g., enabled the BP to distinguish the messages
sent by the first signer from those of the second. This kind
of information, which is crucial for proving properties of the
kind specified above, is lost while generating the Petri net by
using tools such as BPEL2oWFN.
As a result, with our refined model of the DCS, we were able
to verify the property about the contracts that are permanently
stored given above in less than 10 seconds on a standard
laptop. This is an encouraging result about the scalability of
our techniques.
V. CONCLUSION
We have described automated analysis techniques for the
validation of a class of web services specified in BPEL and
RBAC4BPEL. We have used decidable fragments of FOL to
describe the state space of this class of services and then used
the state-of-the-art SMT solver Z3 to solve their reachability
problems. We have applied our techniques to the verification
of a digital contract signing service by using a prototype tool.
The success in solving this verification is due to the flexibility
of our specification framework that allowed us to precisely
capture the interplay between the control flow, the data flow,
and the access-control level of the service. As future work,
we plan, for instance, to extend our decidability results to
WF nets containing restricted form of loops and extensions of
RBAC4BPEL with delegation.
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APPENDIX
PROOFS OF § III-C
Fact 1: Post(K, τi) is equivalent to K[xj+1, xk−1, xl]∧∧
i∈P xi ≥ 0, where K[xj +1, xk−1, xl] denotes the formula
obtained by replacing x′j with xj − 1 for j ∈ U+, x′k with
xk − 1 for k ∈ U−, and x′l with xl + 1 for j ∈ U=.
Proof: Preliminarily, note that if xj = x′j + 1 then x
′
j =
xj − 1 for j ∈ U+, and if xk = x′k − 1 then x′k = xk + 1 for
k ∈ U−. Then, observe the following simple calculations:
Post(K, τi)
[by definition of Post] ⇔ ∃x′1, ..., x′n.(K(x′) ∧ τi(x′, x))
[by definition of τi] ⇔ ∃x′1, ..., x′n.(K(x′1, ..., x′n) ∧∧
i∈P
xi ≥ 0 ∧
∧
j∈U+
xj = x
′
j + 1 ∧∧
k∈U−
xk = x
′
k − 1 ∧
∧
l∈U=
xl = x
′
l)
[by replacement] ⇔ ∃x′.(K[xj + 1, xk − 1, xl] ∧∧
i∈P
xi ≥ 0 ∧
∧
j∈U+
xj = x
′
j + 1 ∧∧
k∈U−
xk = x
′
k − 1 ∧
∧
l∈U=
xl = x
′
l)
[by a property of ∃] ⇔ K[xj + 1, xk − 1, xl] ∧
∧
i∈P
xi ≥ 0 ∧
∃x′.(
∧
j∈U+
xj = x
′
j − 1 ∧∧
k∈U−
xk = x
′
k + 1 ∧
∧
l∈U=
xl = x
′
l)
[by a property of ∃] ⇔ K[xj + 1, xk − 1, xl] ∧
∧
i∈P
xi ≥ 0.
This concludes the proof.
Lemma 1: Let PN := 〈P, T, F 〉 be an acyclic workflow
net and Π be the set of all its paths. Then, the set of
forward reachable states of the VAS 〈x, In(x), {τi(x, x′) | i =
1, ..., n}〉 associated to PN is identified by the formula
FR`(τ, In) for ` = maxpi∈Π{len(pi|T )}, where pi|T is the
sequence obtained from pi by forgetting each of its element in
P and len(pi|T ) is the length of the sequence pi|T .
Before proving the Lemma, we instantiate the notion of
symbolic execution tree (introduced in § III-B) to VASs so
that we can use it in the proof of the results in this part. The
symbolic execution tree of a VAS is a labeled tree defined as
follows: (i) the root node is labeled by the formula In, (ii) a
node n labeled by the formula K has d ≤ n sons n1, ..., nd
labeled by the formulae Post(τ1,K), ..., Post(τd,K) such
that Post(τj ,K) is satisfiable in the underlying model of
the VAS and the edge from n to nj is labeled by τj for
j = 1, ..., d, (iii) a node n labeled by the formula K has
no son, in which case n is a final node, if Post(τj ,K) is
unsatisfiable in the underlying model of the VAS, for each
j = 1, ..., n. A symbolic execution tree of a VAS is 0-complete
if it consists of the root node labeled by the formula In, it is
(d+ 1)-complete for d ≥ 0 if its depth is d+ 1 and for each
node n labeled by a formula Kn at depth d, if Post(τj ,Kn)
is satisfiable, then there exists a node n′ at depth d+1 labeled
by Post(τj ,Kn).
Property 3: Let 〈x, In(x), {τi(x, x′) | i = 1, ..., n}〉 be a
VAS. The disjunction of all the formulae labeling a d-complete
symbolic execution tree of the VAS above is logically equiv-
alent to FR`(τ, In), where τ :=
∨n
i=1 τi.
Proof: First of all, observe that Post distributes over
disjunction, i.e.
Post(τ,K)
[by definition of Post] ⇔ ∃x′.(K(x′) ∧ τi(x′, x))
[by definition of τ ] ⇔ ∃x′.(K(x′) ∧
n∨
i=1
τi(x
′, x))
[by property of ∧,∨,∃] ⇔
n∨
i=1
∃x′.(K(x′) ∧ τi(x′, x))
[by definition of Post] ⇔
n∨
i=1
Post(τi,K).
Then, the property follows by a simple induction on the depth
of the symbolic execution tree.
Interestingly, we observe that the fix-point checks are al-
ways successful for every formula FR`
′
(τ, In) with `′ >
maxpi∈Π{len(pi|T )}, since FR`′(τ, In) = FR`(τ, In) as no
transition is enabled in FR`(τ, In). We can rephrase this in
terms of the symbolic execution tree as follows.
Property 4: Let PN := 〈P, T, F 〉 be an acyclic WF net.
The symbolic execution tree of the VAS associated to PN is
`-complete for every ` ≥ maxpi∈Π{len(pi|T )}.
Proof sketch: This is a consequence of the previous
property and the observation that FR`
′
(τ, In) = FR`(τ, In)
for every `′ > maxpi∈Π{len(pi|T )}.
Now, we establish a connection between (projections of)
paths in a Petri net and (projections of) paths in a symbolic
execution tree.
Property 5: Let PN := 〈P, T, F 〉 be a Petri net, and Π be
the set of all its paths. Then, for each pi ∈ Π, there exists a
path pi′ in the symbolic execution tree of the VAS associated
to PN such that pi|T = pi′|T . The vice versa also holds, i.e. for
each pi′ in the symbolic execution tree of the VAS associated
to PN , there exists a path pi ∈ Π such that pi|T = pi′|T .
Proof sketch: This is a consequence of the previous
property and the fact that sets of reachable markings of Petri
nets and sets of reachable states of associated VASs are in a
one-to-one correspondence.
Lemma 1 is a consequence of the last property above and
the fact that all the paths in the net are of bounded length so
that it is possible to compute the one with maximal length.
PROOFS OF § III-D
Fact 2: Post(K, τi) is equivalent to
(∃u.(K(xcd) ∧ xcd(uj , t) ∧ ξ(u, xcd))) ∨
(∃u.(K[λx, y.(¬(x = uj ∧ y = t) ∧ xcd(x, y))] ∧
ξ[u, λx, y.(¬(x = uj ∧ y = t) ∧ xcd(x, y))])) ,
where K[λx, y.(¬(x = uj∧y = t)∧xcd(x, y))] is the formula
obtained from K by substituting each occurrence of xcd′ with
the λ-expression in the square brackets and then performing
the β-reduction and similarly for ξ[u, λx, y.(¬(x = uj ∧ y =
t) ∧ xcd(x, y))].
Proof: First of all, observe the following. Assume xcd =
λx, y.((x = uj∧y = t)∨xcd ′(x, y)). We have (a) xcd ′ = xcd
if xcd(uj , t) holds and (b) xcd ′ = λx, y.(¬(x = uj ∧ y =
t)∧xcd(x, y) otherwise (i.e. when ¬xcd(uj , t)). Now, consider
the following simple transformations:
Post(K, τi)
⇔ ∃xcd ′.(K(xcd ′) ∧ τi(xcd ′, xcd))
⇔ ∃xcd ′.(K(xcd ′) ∧ ∃u.(ξ(u, xcd ′) ∧
∀x, y.(xcd(x, y)⇔ ((x = uj ∧ y = t) ∨ xcd ′(x, y)))))
⇔ ∃xcd ′.(K(xcd ′) ∧
∃u.((xcd ′(uj , t) ∨ ¬xcd ′(uj , t)) ∧ ξ(u, xcd ′) ∧
∀x, y.(xcd(x, y)⇔ ((x = uj ∧ y = t) ∨ xcd ′(x, y)))))
⇔ ∃xcd ′.(K(xcd ′) ∧
(∃u.((xcd ′(uj , t)) ∧ ξ(u, xcd ′) ∧
∀x, y.(xcd(x, y)⇔ ((x = uj ∧ y = t) ∨ xcd ′(x, y))))) ∨
(∃u.((¬xcd ′(uj , t)) ∧ ξ(u, xcd ′) ∧
∀x, y.(xcd(x, y)⇔ ((x = uj ∧ y = t) ∨ xcd ′(x, y))))))
⇔ ∃xcd ′.(K(xcd ′) ∧
(∃u.((xcd ′(uj , t)) ∧ ξ(u, xcd ′) ∧
∀x, y.(xcd(x, y)⇔ xcd ′(x, y)))) ∨
(∃u.((¬xcd ′(uj , t)) ∧ ξ(u, xcd ′) ∧
∀x, y.(xcd(x, y)⇔ ((x = uj ∧ y = t) ∨ xcd ′(x, y))))))
⇔ ∃xcd ′.(K(xcd ′) ∧
(∃u.((xcd ′(uj , t)) ∧ ξ(u, xcd ′) ∧
∀x, y.(xcd(x, y)⇔ xcd ′(x, y)))) ∨
(∃u.((¬xcd ′(uj , t)) ∧ ξ(u, xcd ′) ∧
∀x, y.(xcd ′(x, y)⇔ (¬(x = uj ∧ y = t) ∧ xcd(x, y))))))
⇔ ∃xcd ′.(
(∃u.(K(xcd ′) ∧ (xcd ′(uj , t)) ∧ ξ(u, xcd ′) ∧
∀x, y.(xcd(x, y)⇔ xcd ′(x, y)))) ∨
(∃u.(K(xcd ′) ∧ (¬xcd ′(uj , t) ∧ ξ(u, xcd ′) ∧
∀x, y.(xcd ′(x, y)⇔ (¬(x = uj ∧ y = t) ∧ xcd(x, y))))))
⇔ (∃u.(K(xcd) ∧ (xcd(uj , t)) ∧ ξ(u, xcd))) ∨
(∃u.(K[λx, y.(¬(x = uj ∧ y = t) ∧ xcd(x, y))] ∧
ξ[u, λx, y.(¬(x = uj ∧ y = t) ∧ xcd(x, y))])).
This concludes the proof.
For completeness, as done for VASs, we instantiate the
notion of symbolic execution tree (introduced in § III-B)
to RBAC4BPEL systems. The symbolic execution tree of a
RBAC4BPEL system is a labeled tree defined as follows: (i)
the root node is labeled by the formula In, (ii) a node n labeled
by the formula K has d ≤ n sons n1, ..., nd labeled by the
formulae Post(τ1,K), ..., Post(τd,K) such that Post(τj ,K)
is satisfiable in the underlying model of the RBAC4BPEL and
the edge from n to nj is labeled by τj for j = 1, ..., d, (iii)
a node n labeled by the formula K has no son, in which
case n is a final node, if Post(τj ,K) is unsatisfiable in the
underlying model of the RBAC4BPEL, for each j = 1, ..., n.
A symbolic execution tree of a RBAC4BPEL system is 0-
complete if it consists of the root node labeled by the formula
In, it is (d + 1)-complete for d ≥ 0 if its depth is d + 1
and for each node n labeled by a formula Kn at depth d,
if Post(τj ,Kn) is satisfiable, then there exists a node n′ at
depth d+ 1 labeled by Post(τj ,Kn).
Property 6: Let 〈p, In(p), {τi(p, p′) | i = 1, ..., n}〉 be
a RBAC4BPEL system. The disjunction of all the for-
mulae labeling a d-complete symbolic execution tree of
the RBAC4BPEL system above is logically equivalent to
FR`(τ, In), where τ :=
∨n
i=1 τi.
The proof is almost identical to that of Property 3 and it is
thus omitted.
PROOFS OF § III-E
Preliminarily, we modularly define the sequence of formulae
characterizing sets of forward reachable states and the sym-
bolic execution trees of VAS+RBAC4BPEL systems by re-
using the associated VAS and RBAC4BPEL system.
For the formulae describing the set of forward reach-
able states, define the following sequence, by recursion:
FR0(K, τ) := K and FRi+1(K, τ) := (PostiV (FR
i, τ) ∧
PostiR(FR
i, τ))∨FRi(K, τ) for i ≥ 0, K := KV ∧KR, KV
is a formula of LA, KR is a BSR formula, and τ :=
∨n
k=1 τi.
For the symbolic execution system of a VAS+RBAC4BPEL
system, preliminarily introduce the following two labeling
functions. Given a node of the symbolic execution tree for a
VAS+RBAC4BPEL system, the VAS-labeling function returns
PostiV (FR
i, τ) while the RBAC4BPEL-labeling function re-
turns PostiR(FR
i, τ). Then, the symbolic execution tree of
a VAS+RBAC4BPEL system is a (multi-)labeled tree defined
as follows: (i) the root node is VAS-labeled by the formula
InV and RBAC4BPEL-labeled by the formula InR, (ii) a
node n VAS-labeled by the formula KV and RBAC4BPEL-
labeled by the formula KR has d ≤ n sons n1, ..., nd, each
nj is VAS-labeled by the formula PostV (τj ,K) such that
PostV (τj ,K) is satisfiable in the structure underlying the
associated VAS and it is RBAC4BPEL-labeled by the formula
PostR(τj ,K) such that PostR(τj ,K) is satisfiable in the
structure underlying the associated RBAC4BPEL system, and
the edge from n to nj is labeled by τj for j = 1, ..., d, (iii) a
node n labeled by the formula K has no son, in which case n
is a final node, if both PostV (τj ,K) is unsatisfiable modulo
Linear Arithmetic and PostR(τj ,K) is unsatisfiable modulo
the BSR theory, for each j = 1, ..., n. A symbolic execution
tree of a VAS+RBAC4BPEL system is 0-complete if it consists
of the root node VAS-labeled by the formula InV and RBAC-
labeled by the formula InR, it is (d+ 1)-complete for d ≥ 0
if its depth is d+ 1 and for each node n labeled by a formula
Kn at depth d, if both PostV (τj ,Kn) is satisfiable modulo
LA and PostR(τj ,Kn) is satisfiable modulo the BSR theory,
then there exists a node n′ at depth d + 1 VAS-labeled by
PostV (τj ,Kn) and RBAC4BPEL-labeled by PostR(τj ,Kn).
Property 7: Let 〈x, p, InV (x) ∧ InR(p), {τVi (x, x′) ∧
τRi (p, p
′) | i = 1, ..., n}〉 be a VAS+RBAC system. The
disjunction of the conjunction between the VAS-labeling and
RBAC-labeling formulae of all the nodes in a d-complete
symbolic execution tree is logically equivalent to FR`(τ, In),
where τ :=
∨n
i=1 τi.
The proof is along the lines of that of Property 3 and uses
the modularity of the post-image computation (see Fact 3).
We are now ready to prove the main result of the paper.
Theorem 1: Let PN := 〈P, T, F 〉 be a an acyclic
WF net and 〈x, InV (x), {τVi (x, x′) | i = 1, ..., n}〉 be its
associated VAS. Furthermore, let 〈p, InR(p), {τRi (p, p′) | i =
1, ..., n}〉 be the RBAC system with a finite and known
set of users. Then, the symbolic reachability problem of
the VAS+RBAC4BPEL system whose associated VAS and
RBAC4BPEL system are those specified above is decidable.
Proof: Let GV (x) ∧ GR(p) be a goal formula such that
GV is a LA formula and GR be a BSR formula. By Property 2,
we know that there exists a bound ` ≥ 0 such that for every
` ≥ `, the symbolic execution tree of the VAS+RBAC4BPEL
system is `-complete. Furthermore, by Property 7, we know
that the disjunction of all VAS-labeling and RBAC4BPEL-
labeling formulae is equivalent to FR`(τ, In). Because of the
`-completeness of the symbolic execution tree, we know that
FR`(τ, In) is a fix-point; hence, FR`(τ, In) describes the set
of all forward reachable states of the VAS+RBAC4BPEL sys-
tem. By induction on the length of the sequence FR0, FR1, ...
of formulae, it is easy to show that each FRi is equivalent to
the conjunction between a formula of Linear Arithmetic, say
FRiV , and a BSR formula, say FR
i
R. Hence, we conclude that
FR`(τ, In) is equivalent to FR`V ∧ FR`R. Thus, in order to
solve the goal reachability problem, it is sufficient to check
the satisfiability of the following formula:
(FR`V ∧ FR`R) ∧ (GV (x) ∧GR(p))
modulo the union of LA and the BSR theory. This problem
can be reduced to two separate satisfiability problems modulo
a single theory, namely: (i) checking the satisfiability of
FR`V ∧ GV (x)
modulo Linear Arithmetic and (ii) checking the satisfiability
of
FR`R ∧ GR(p)
modulo the BSR theory. Both of these problems are well-
known to be decidable and hence the overall problem is
decidable. This concludes the proof.
